Penelko, Inc., A Utah Corporation v. Price Rentals, Inc., A Utah Corporation And John Price Associates, Inc., A Utah Corporation, Et Al. : Appellant\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Penelko, Inc., A Utah Corporation v. Price Rentals,
Inc., A Utah Corporation And John Price
Associates, Inc., A Utah Corporation, Et Al. :
Appellant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Merlin R. Lybbert and Rex R. Madsen; Attorneys for
Respondent, Price Rentals, Inc.William H. Henderson adn Mark S. Miner; Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Penelko v. Price Rentals, No. 16601 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1867
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PENELKO, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PRICE RENTALS, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, No. 16601 
and 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Defend.ants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
REX R. MADSEN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Price Rentals, Inc. 
700 Continental Bank Buildina 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-1615 
MARK S. MINER 
Newhouse Building, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-1449 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PENELKO, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PRICE RENTALS, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, No. 16601 
and 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
REX R. MADSEN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Price Rentals, Inc. 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-1615 
MARK S. MINER 
Newhouse Building, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-1449 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE 
1. Particular Facts Relating to Appellant's 
Motion for Injunctive Relief . . . 
2. Particular Facts Relating to Appellant's 
Motion for Attorney's Fees 
P._P.GUMENT . . . . . . . . . . 
1. Respondent's Willfull Tresspass on Appellant's 
Property and Willful Violation of its Lease 
Relating to Appellant's Property Entitled 








Law . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • 5 
2. Respondent Price Rentals, Inc. Assumed the 
Obligations of Appellant's Lease and 
Consequently is Responsible for Attorney's 
Fees as is Provided in the Lease . . . . . 6 
3. Respondent's Contention in the Lower Court 
That by Reason of this Appeal the Trial Court 
was Divested of Jurisdiction to Rule on 
Attorney's Fees is Likewise Without Merit . 11 
4. Responcent's Contention in the Lower Court 
that Because Respondent's Breach of Appellant's 
Lease Was Tortious in Nature, Appellant was not 
Entitled to Attorney's Fees is Clearly Without 
Merit as was Ruled by the Trial Court in its 
Memorandum Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
5. Respondent's Basic Contention in the Lower 
Court That the Issue of Attorney's Fees Was 
One in Fact For the Jury and Not for the Court, 
Likewise Lacks Merit ............. 14 
( i) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Agmar v. Solomon 
87 Cal. App. 127, 261, p. 1029 (1927) 
Ansco Const. Co. v. Ocean View Estates 
196 Cal. App. 2d 235, 337, P2d 146 
Barrell v. Renehan 
114 Vt. 23, 39 A2d 330 (1944) 
Branch Realty, Inc. v. Waldbaurn, Inc. 
249 N.Y.S. 2d 32 (1964) 
Caldwell v. Trans-Gulf Petroleum Corp. 
312 Co. 2d 171 (1975) 
City of Dunsmuir v. Silva 
154 Cal. App. 2d 925, 317 P/.d 653 (1957) 
Ercanbrack v. Clark 
79 Utah 233, 8 P2d P. 1093 (1932) 
FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc. 
17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P2d 670 (1965) 
Genis v. Krasne 
47 Cal 2d 241, 302 P2d 389 (1956) 
Heidt v. Miller Air Conditioning Co. 
271 Cal App 2d 135, 74 Cal Rptr 695 (1969) 
Henderson v. Ogden City Ry Co. 
7 Utah 199, 26, p. 286 ( 1891) 
Latses v. Nick, Inc. 
99 Utah 214, 104 P2d 619 
Lusk v. Krejci 
187 Cal. App 2d 553, 9 Cal Rptr 703 (1960) 
Mabee v. Nurseryland Garden Centers, Inc., 
88 Cal App 3d 42, 152 Cal Rptr 31 (1975) 
Malibu Lake Mountain Club, Ltd. v. Smith 
18 Cal App 31, 95 Cal Rptr, 553 (1971) 
Needle v. Scheinberg 
18 7 Md . 16 9 I 4 9 A2 d 3 3 4 ( 19 4 6 ) 
Peters v. Davis 




















Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Action for damages and injunctive relief and attorney's 
fees for alleged willful violation of appellant's lease. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
In a jury trial a general verdict was rendered in favor 
of appellant in the amount of $65,000. The judgment on this 
verdict is the subject of respondent Price Rentals, Inc. ap-
peal in Appeal No. 16588. Following the jury's verdict and 
judgment thereon, the lower court, the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft presiding, on July 2, 1979, denied plaintiff's motion 
for injunctive relief and by an order filed September 12, 
1979, denied appellant's motion to assess attorney's fees. 
(1216, 1659) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Penelko, Inc. seeks reversal of the lower 
court's order filed July 2, 1979, denying plaintiff's motion 
for injunctive relief and an order of the Supreme Court 
ordering injunctive relief as prayed for in the complaint. 
Appellant, Penelko, Inc. also seeks reversal of the 
lower court's order filed September 12, 1979, denying appel-
lant's motion for attorney's fees and an order of the Supreme 
Court directinq the lower court to fix appellant's attorney's 
fees including reasonable attorney's fees for work on Price 
Rentals, Inc. Appeal No. 16588, and Penelko, Inc. Appeal 
Nn 16601. 
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MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE 
The facts of this cause are set forth in Penelko, 
Inc. 's Respondent's Brief in Appeal No. 16588. We adopt 
these facts by reference and set forth below only such addi-
tional facts as are particularly relevant to this appeal by 
Penelko, Inc. (appellant) seeking reversal of the trial 
court's orders denying it equitable relief and denying it 
attorney's fees. 
1. Particular Facts Relating to Appellant's Motion 
for Injunctive Relief 
On March 24, 1979, the jury brought in a general ver-
diet in favor of plaintiff, Penelko, Inc., the appellant 
herein, on this appeal. (1104) 
Based on tr.is verdict, which constituted a finding by 
the jury that Price Rentals, Inc. had violated appellant's 
lease, appellant on June 14, 1979, moved for injunctive re-
lief. (1134) The motion for injunctive relief was denied 
by the court on July 2, 1979. (1216, 1217) 
2. Particular Facts Relating to Appellant's Motion 
for Attorney's Fees 
The jury's findings by its general verdict was that 
Price Rentals, Inc. had violated appellant's lease. Para-
graph 20 of the lease provided that in the event either 
party shall fail to perform this lease and agreement accord-
ing to its terms, such party hereby agrees to pay all costs 
and expenses (including reasonably attorney's fees). (See 
paragraph 20 Exh. 1-P) 
Paragraph 2 of Malstroms's lease to Price Rentals, Inc. 
dated December 1, 1977, provides that respondent lessee Price 
., 
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Rentals, Inc. shall be in full possession and control of the 
leased premises and that the Penelko lease described in Ex-
hibit "A" attached to the agreement is sold, assigned and 
transferred in its entirety by the lessor to lessees Price 
Rentals, Inc. (Paragraph 2 page 3 of Malstrom's lease to 
Price Rentals, Inc. Exh. 7-P) 
Exhibit "A" of Malstrom's lease to Price Rentals, Inc. 
provides that Price Rentals, Inc. is subject to Penelko's 
lease. (See page 2 Exhibit "A" of Exh. 7-P) The lease is 
signed by the Malstroms and by Price Rentals, Inc. by John 
Price, president. John Price guarantees the prompt and faith-
ful performance of all of the obligations of the tenant in 
the lease. (See page 20 of Exh. 7-P) 
All the violations of appellant's lease were committed 
by respondent Price Rentals, Inc. as is set forth in "MATER-
IAL FACTS OF THE CASE" in Penelko's respondent's brief, 
Appeal No. 16588 incorporated herein by reference. 
Prior to the conclusion of the trial in this cause, 
appellant submitted instructions to the jury on attorney's 
fees. These instructions were not given by the court. The 
court writing on the instructions: "Denied--to be determined 
by the court. " And this was reiterated in chambers by the 
court. (See Judge Croft's memorandum decision, 1653) Con-
sequently, appellant adduced no evidence to the jury 
regarding attorney's fees. 
After the jury's verdict and the judgment thereon, and 
on July 9, 1979, appellant moved for attorney's fees. 
3 
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(1104 - 1108, 1221) Thereafter, on July 19, 1979, Price 
Rentals, Inc. filed its Motion for Appeal. ( 1231) 
Appellant's attorney, William H. Henderson, filed a 
detailed affidavit showing the services performed in this 
cause and requesting attorney's fees for his work in the 
amount of $15,000. (1225 - 1230) co-counsel Mark Miner also 
filed a like affidavit in support of attorney's fees for his 
services in the amount of $15,000 mak.ing a total amount re-
quested for attorney's fees of $30,000. (1245 - 1247) 
On September 11, 1979, Judge Croft filed his memorandum 
decision denying appellant's attorney's fees. ( 1649 - 1645) 
In Judge Croft's memorandum decision the court found 
that appellant had net waived its claim for attorney's fees 
by not submitting evidence inasmuch as appellant was in 
effect precluded from submitting evidence by reason of the 
court's denial of its instruction on attorney's fees. (1654) 
The court also found that it did not lose jurisdiction 
to rule on attorney's fees because Price Rentals, Inc. had 
filed its notice of appeal before it had ruled on appel-
lant's motion for attorney's fees. The court ruled that it 
retained jurisdiction on this undecided issue. (1653 - 1654) 
The court also ruled that the issue of attorney's fees 
was for the court. ( 1653) 
The court further found that the cause was submitted 
to the jury, "Based upon a breach of plaintiff's [appellant's] 
lease". And in such case it mattered not "whether the alleged 
breach of the lease smacks of tort or contract." (1655) 
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The lower court, per Judge Croft in his memorandum 
decision, denied appellant's motion for attorney's fees on 
the sole ground that there was lack of privity between ap-
pellant and Price Rentals, Inc. and that as the covenant 
for attorney's fees in appellant's lease was not one running 
with the land, it was not binding on Price Rentals, Inc., 
citing Latses v. Nick, Inc. 99 Utah 214, 104 p. 2d 619, 
( 1655 - 1656) 
On September 14, 1979, formal order denying appellant's 
motion for attorney's fees was filed with the court. The 
court worte in this order denying attorney's fees, "For the 
reason set forth in the memorandum decision." (1659) 
ARGUMENT 
1. Respondent's Willfull Tresspass on Appellant's 
Property and Willful Violation of its Lease Relat-
ing to Appellant's Property Entitled Appellant to 
Injunctive Relief as a Matter of Law 
One property right willfully violated by respondent 
was its landscaping over appellant's leased parking space, 
including erection of the flagpole and the building of a 
roadway over such space. This was done with knowledge of 
appellant's lease and over its protests, as mentioned in 
"MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE", Penelko's Respondent's Brief. 
The very least that Penelko, Inc. owned under paragraph 
3 of its lease, was to use the leased parking place "in 
common with ... tenants of adjoining properties", which 
I 
in this case was Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant. (See 
5 
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paragraphs 3 and 7, page 2, Exh. 1-P) Consequently, Price 
Rentals' construction on the parking and preventing Penelko's 
use of it in common with Perkins' Cake & Steak or otherwise, 
entitled appellant to a mandatory injunction as a matter of 
law, removing the roadway and the landscaping over this 
leased parking space. 
Another property right, willfully violated by respond-
ent Price Rentals, Inc. was the construction of the Perkins' 
Cake & Steak Restaurant. As is pointed out in "MATERIAL 
FACTS OF CASE" Penelko's appellant's brief; paragraph 7 of 
Penelko's lease provided that its lessor, the Malstroms, must 
provide in the leases of adjoining properties, "similar agree-
ments and agreements on use of parking in common" and that 
neither Malstroms "Offer to Lease" or lease to Price Rentals 
or Price Rentals' lease to Perkins' Cake & Steak contained 
a similar covenant. Further, Perkins' Cake & Steak Restau-
rant was constructed on approximately all the land leased 
anc did not provide any common parking space. It did not 
even provide 24 spaces required by the Sandy City C. U. P. 
Ordinance. This factual situation stands uncontradicted in 
the record, and is found by the jury in its award of damages 
to appellant. Consequently, as a matter of law, the court 
should order respondent Price Rentals, Inc. to remove the 
Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant. 
The court has authority to grant a mandatory injunc-
tion. Rule 65A, URCP, §(e) (4) provides for injunctive 
relief, "in all other cases where an injunction would be 
proper in equity." 
6 
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In Henderson v. Ogden City Ry Co., 7 u. 199, 26, p. 286, 
(1891), the court granted a mandatory injunction as well as a 
preventive writ when defencant piled obstructions on plain-
tiff's road bed. 
Mandatory injunction should not be denied where en-
croachment was intentional. 
This fundamental rule was pronounced and applied in 
Agmar v. Solomon, 87 Cal. App. 127, 261, p. 1029 (1927), 
But as the encroachment was intentional and was 
not the result of accident or innocent mistake, 
the cost of removing it or the absence of damage 
to owner of the land encroached on will not de-
feat the right of such owner to a mandatory 
injunction. 
See to same effect: Lusk v. Krejci, 187 Cal. App. 2d 
553, 9 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1960); Branch Realty, Inc. v. Waldbaurn, 
Inc. 249 N.Y.S. 2d 32 (1964); City of Dunsmuir v. Silva, 
154 Cal. App. 2d 925, 317 P. 2d 653 (1957); Peters v. Davis, 
426 Pa. 231, A. 2d 748 ( 1967). 
If a property owner, deliberately and intention-
ally violates a valid express restriction running 
with the land or intentionally 'takes a chance' 
the appropriate remedy is a mandatory injunction 
to eradicate the violation. (our emphasis) 
Defendant Price Rentals, Inc. 's encroachment on plain-
tiff's parking space is by its nature, continuous. This 
calls for a mandatory injunction. 
Needle v. Scheinberg, 187 Md. 169, 49 A 2d 334 (1946). 
It has long been recognized that, though a fugi-
tive and temporary tresspass will not be enjoined, 
a continuing tresspass will be enjoined if it 
would be ruinous or irreparable, or would impair 
the just enjoyment of the property. 
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See Barrell v. Renehan, 114 Vt. 23, 39 A2d 330 (1944) 
See also Ercanbrack v. Clark, 79 Utah 233, 8 P2d P. 
1093 (1932). 
2. Respondent Price Rentals, Inc. Assumed the Obliga-
tions of Appellant's Lease and Cons~quentl~ is 
Responsible for Attorney's Fees as is Provided in 
the Lease. 
As is mentioned above, respondent Price Rentals, Inc. 
by written agreement, specifically agreed to take the assign-
ment of appellant's lease subject to appellant's lease. 
Price Rentals, Inc. took possession of the property and did 
all the acts complained of in violation of Penelko, Inc. 's 
lease. 
Authorities are net numerous. For where an assignee 
signs an agreement accepting a lease subject to a prior 
lease, it would appear ~Fortiori that under contract law, 
the assignee is subject to the terms of the prior lease. 
The authorities appellant has found and cites below all 
agree that when a subsequent lease agrees in writing to take 
a lease subject to the prior lease, it is bound by the pro-
visions of the prior lease, whether or not the provision is 
one that is appurtenant to and would run with the land. 
In Pickler v. Mershon (Iowa) 236 NW 382 (1931) by the 
provisions of the assignment, "the lessees assigned and the 
assignee accepted the lease." At issue was the subsequent 
assignee's liability for rent under the original lease which 
provision was not appurtenant and not running with the land. 
If a mere naked assignment of the right, title, 
and interest of the lessees was all that was 
8 
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intended, the signature of the appellees thereto 
was unnecessary. Where the lessee, in a written 
lease of land, assigns the lease to another, who 
accepts in writing the assignment, the latter exe-
cutes a contract in writing, binding him to 
perform the conditions of the lease though in the 
writing there may be no mention of the obligations 
assumed. 
See Schmidt v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 139 Ky. 81, 129 
332, 335. In Schmidt the lessee assigned its lease. The 
original lessee had agreed to operate the railroad line and 
apply the net earnings to payment of bonds. The issue was 
whether the assignee was bound by this covenant inasmuch as 
it was not one that was appurtenant to or ran with the land. 
The assignment and the acceptance was in writing. The ques-
tion at issue was whether this acceptance by the assignee 
bound it on all provisions of the lease including the obli-
gations to run the railroad and pay on the bonds. It was 
argued that it was not binding in that nowhere in the papers 
was there any mention of the fact that this obligation was 
assumed. The court ruled: 
It would be idle, in view of what has been written 
in the other opinions supra concerning the effect 
of the various writings between these corporations, 
to say that the Louisville & Nashville Railroad 
Company did not assume all the obligations imposed 
by the lease that it purchased, or that it only 
took over so much of it as was beneficial to it 
and rejected the balance. It took it with all its 
burdens and has acted under and by virtue of it. 
When it signed the paper of which the lease was a 
part, it was the same in effect as if it had signed 
the lease itself. If the lessee, in a written 
contract concerning land, assigns his lease to 
another, and that other accepts in writing the 
assignment, we cannot doubt that this is a c~n~ract 
in writinq signed by him to perform the conditions 
of the lease accepted, althouqh in the specific 
writing that he sign there may be no mention of 
9 
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what obligation he has assumed. It is not neces-
sary that there should be. Why should he accept 
in writing a lease, and substitute himself for the 
lessee, unless it be to do all the.lessor had 
aqreed to do? If the party accepting the lease 
does not desire or intend to do this, or if it is 
not the purpose of the acceptance of the lease to 
take it with all its burdens as well as benefits, 
the assignee can easily insert conditions in the 
acceptance that will exempt him from such liability 
as he does not care to assume. (our emphasis) 
Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. Rea, 184 Cal. 565, 194 
P. 1024 (1920) also so holds. The lease contained a provi-
sion obligating the lessees to erect buildings, pay rent, and 
provide repairs. The lease was assigned. The lessee elected 
to extend the terms of the lease by a Notice of Election that 
provided that election was "subject to all the terms and 
conditions in said lease contained." In holding that the 
lessee and assignee were equally bound by the covenants, the 
court ruled: 
This express declaration that the parties were to 
be governed by the covenants of the lease, signed 
by the assignee, and accepted by the lessor defin-
itely created and established a contractual relation 
between the lessor and the assignee, and the 
covenants of the lease were made the measure of the 
rights and liabilities of the parties for the ex-
tended three-year period. 
The case of Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc. 99 Utah 214, 104 
P2d 619 (1940) cited by Judge Croft in support of his 
order denying plaintiff's attorney's fees does not support 
Judge Croft's holding. In Latses, there was no sale or trans-
fer or subsequent lease by their original lessor in writing 
whereby the lease was transferred subject to the terms of the 
original lease. Nor was there any assignment by the lessor 
10 
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by written document wherein it was taken subject to the terms 
of the lease. There was no prior contract whatsoever between 
the parties. 
In Latses the plaintiffs purchased the property. The 
defendant was a tenant in possession. The tenants had a lease 
with the former owners. The purchasers had no actual know-
ledge of the provisions of the lease but by the possession of 
the tenant was put on inquiry of defendant's occupancy. The 
court held them bound by such claims relating to those running 
with the land, but as there was no contract or privity, they 
were not bound on the personal covenant for attorney's fees. 
In the instant case there was privity of contract be-
tween Malstroms and Price Rentals, Inc. As mentioned, Price 
Rentals, Inc., by written agreement, purchased (and subleased) 
Malstroms' Penelko lease subject to the obligations of the 
Penelko lease. 
3. Respondent's Contention in the Lower Court That by 
Reason of this Appeal the Trial Court was Divested 
of Jurisdiction to Rule on Attorney's Fees is Like-
wise Without Merit. 
As the court pointed out in its memorandum decision, 
the appellant's motion for allowance and assessment of attar-
ney's fees was filed July 9, 1979. And subsequent to that, 
July 19, 1979 respondent filed its Notice of Appeal. As the. 
lower court pointed out, the appeal did not deprive the 
court of jurisdiction to rule on the undecided issue before 
the appeal was filed; namely, the issue of attorney's fees. 
(1649) 
4. Respondent's Contention in the Lower Court that 
Because Respondent's Breach of Appellant's Lease 
11 
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was Tortious in Nature, Appellant was not Entitled 
to Attorney's Fees is Clearly Without Merit as 
was Ruled by the Trial Court in its Memorandum 
Decision 
The court's instructions to the jury disclosed that the 
case was submitted to the jury based upon a breach of appel-
lant's rights under its lease. And the trial court ruled 
that it matters not whether alleged breach of the lease was 
tortious in nature. It would appear on the face of it that 
a tortious violation of the lease is even more demanding of 
a right to attorney's fees than a non-tortious violation. 
And the courts so hold. 
In Stockton Theaters v. Palermo, 124 Cal. App. 2d 872, 
53 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1966) (a case strikingly similar to the 
instant case) the court allowed plaintiff lessee attorney's 
fees for defendant's tortious violations of the lease, ruling: 
Plaintiff's action sought relief against the 
defendants (lessors) for their tortious invasion 
of the plaintiff's rights arising out of the 
lease. The defendants did not prevail in the ac-
tion but the plaintiff did prevail. Under the 
provisions of the lease the plaintiff was entitled 
to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. (Ans co 
Const. Co. v. Ocean View Estates, 196 Cal. App~.~-
2d 235, 337, p2d 146.) (our emphasis) 
The case of Malibu Lake Mountain Club, Ltd. v. Smith, 
18 Cal. App. 31, 95 Cal. Rptr., 553 (1971) is on all fours 
with the instant case except that the contract involved was 
not a lease but the by-laws of the club. 
In Malibu, the club brought suit under the by-laws 
against the club members. The by-laws covered contractual vio-
lations and tortious ones and provided for attorney's fees to 
enforce the obligation of the members under the by-laws. 
12 
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The court gave short thrift to defendants' contention 
that attorney's fees cannot be given for tortious acts when 
provided for by contract, ruling: 
The validity of contractual provisions for the 
payment of attorney fees in case of litigation is 
too well settled to allow of re-examination at 
this date. (See, for example, Heidt v. Miller 
Air Conditioning Co. (1969) 271 Cal App 2d 135, 
74 Cal Rptr 695, and authorities there cited 
there can be no question that the by-laws, above 
quoted, apply to any and all litigation between 
the clUb and its meiribers, whether sounding in 
tort or in contract and whether by way of suit, 
defense, cross-complaint or counterclaim. Appel-
lant, however, argues that assuming the validity 
of contracts to pay attorney fees in actions 
sounding in contract, it is against public policy 
to allow such a contract in cases of torts. 
However, we do not deal here with a cause of ac-
tion quite independent of the basic contractual 
arrangement between Smith and the club. The 
counterclaim, admittedly based on the Tooke 
theory, rested upon the alleged breach by the club 
of the implied covenants attached to Smith's 
membership. As such it was clearly within the 
provisions of section 6 of the by-laws and not 3 
against any public policy of which we are aware. 
(Citing authorities) (our emphasis) 
Our Supreme Court, in Petersen v. Hodges, 121 Utah 72 
239 P2d 180, (1951) recognized the well-settled rule that 
there may be recovery of attorney's fees in a lease provi-
sion providing for same. 
We have checked authorities from such sources as the 
ALR Reports, Amer Jur 2d and CJS and have Shepardized cases· 
touching the issue. We have found no case denying a liti-
gant attorney's fees when same is provided for by lease or 
contract and whether such violation is tortious or other-
wise. Appellant respectfully submits it should not be denied 
attorney's fees in the instant case. 
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5. Respondent's Basic Contention in the Lower Court 
That the Issue of Attorney's Fees Was One in Fact 
For the Jury and Not for the Court, Likewise Lacks 
Merit. 
As we have pointed out above, the trial court fore-
closed appellant's introduction of evidence to the jury by 
the refusal to accept its proposed instructions and also 
stating that this was an issue for the court. Consequently, 
whether or not the issue of attorney's fees was for the jury 
or the trial judge, the cause should be reversed and sub-
mitted to either a trial judge or a jury for determination. 
But appellant submits (after review of the authorities) 
that the issue is clearly one for the trial judge to decide--
not the jury. 
In the lower court, respondent cited State v. Kendrick, 
(Oregon) 363 P 2d 1078 (1961) as holding that the amount of 
attorney's fees to be awarded was to be determined by the 
jury. (1261) Respondent's statement was out of context 
with the holding and most misleading. Kendrick was a 
condemnation action. The case was tried by a jury which 
fixed the damages to be paid defendants (as in the instant 
case). Thereafter, the judge held a hearing and fixed the 
attorney's fees. The court mentioned that a prior Oregon 
statute providing for attorney's fees in condemnation actions 
had been interpreted and meaning that the attorney's fees 
must be fixed by the jury. It further pointed out that the 
prior statute had been amended, "to provide for the recovery 
of attorney's fees ... to be fixed by the court". (our 
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emphasis) The court held that under such statute and since 
1947, it had been a uniform practice for the judge to fix 
attorney's fees. Consequently, in Kendrick, the trial judge's 
fixing of attorney's fees was affirmed on appeal. 
As is mentioned above, paragraph 20 of appellant's 
lease provided, 
In the event that either party shall fail to 
perform this lease and agreement according to its 
terms, such party hereby agrees to pay all of the 
costs and expenses of enforcing this agreement, 
either by suit or otherwise, includinq reasonable 
attorney's fees. ·· 
When attorney's fees are based on such a contractual 
provision, attorney's fees are in the nature of costs and 
are fixed by the trial judge, not by the jury. 
In FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 
404 P 2d 670 (1965) the Supreme Court stated as to attorney's 
fees, 
Because both judges and lawyers have special know-
ledge as to the value of legal services, this is 
not always required to be proved by sworn testi-
mony. It is sometimes submitted upon stipulation: 
as to the amount; or that the judge may fix it on 
the basis of his own knowledge and experience; 
and/or in connection with reference to a Bar ap-
proved schedule. Any one of these would have 
provided an evidentiary basis for making the 
determination. 
Mabee v. Nurseryland Garden Centers, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 
3d 42, 152 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1975) involved a breach of a writ-
ten lease containing a provision that the prevailing party 
should recover attorney's fees as set by the court. The 
case had been tried by a jury. It presented the issue of 
whether the judge or the jury should set the amount of 
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attorney's fees. The court ruled that the judge, not the 
jury, should set them, stating, 
Therefore, of necessity we must focus on this 
precise language of this attorney fee provis~on. 
Its plain, explicit, unambiguous language evi-
dences this intent. It is the court, i. e. the 
judge, not the jury who determines the right to 
and amount of attorney fees. 
A legion of cases without comment equate 
"court" with the "judge" or judges are frequently 
used synonymously in statutes. 
See also Genis v. Krasne, 47 Cal 2d 241, 302 P 2d 289 
( 1956), 
But attorney's fees are not like the usual item 
of damages, for the court may allow a reasonable 
attorney's fee in the judgment without hearing 
evidence or making a finding as to the amount 
of such fee. 
Caldwell v. Trans-Gulf Petroleum Corp., (a) 312 So. 2d 
171 (1975) also involved the fixing of attorney's fees by 
the court. The Affidavit of the plaintiff on attorney's fees 
was not before the appellate court. In ruling that the trial 
court (by the judge) should fix attorney's fees. The court 
stated, 
We do not question the authority of the trial 
court to fix reasonable attorney's fees in the 
absence of expert testimony and to establish 
the value of the services where the services are 
rendered under the eye of the court. Also, where 
the nature and extent of services are shown by 
the record, no expert testimony is necessary. 
This was the ruling made by the trial judge and we be-
lieve it should stand. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of July, 1980. 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON and 
MARR S~R 
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